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Abstract—With market-driven secondary spectrum trading,
licensed users can receive benefits in terms of monetary rewards
or various transmission services, thus setting a fair pricing
structure by suitably defining spectrum quality characteristics
and accurately addressing participant’s requirement is a key
issue. In this paper, we investigate the pricing-based spectrum
access by casting the problem of spectrum pricing into a Hotelling
game model according to spectrum quality diversity. Particularly,
we first build a pricing system model where unused spectrum
from primary systems with different qualities forms a spectrum
pool and can be divided into a number of uniform channels.
A secondary user purchases a channel for usage according to
its selection preference which is closely related to the channel
quality and spectrum evaluation. The secondary user not only
needs to consider the channel’s quality and price, but also
the interference cost on primary system. Detailed analysis on
the policy preference of both primary system and secondary
buyer are provided. By forming a game problem of spectrum
pricing between primary and secondary users, we apply the
Hotelling game model to handle the interaction between the
participants. Specifically, by fixing Nash equilibrium of the game,
an iterative algorithm for spectrum pricing is proposed based on
the distribution characteristics of secondary user’s preference.
Essential analysis for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium along with algorithm’s convergence conditions are
provided. Numerical results are also supplemented to show the
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in ensuring spectrum
owner’s profit.
Index Terms—Dynamic spectrum access, spectrum allocation,
Nash equilibrium, iterative convergence
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the development of emerging new multimediaservices, growing demands for spectrum resource can-
not be fully satisfied by the latest multimedia transmission
and broadband technique. The contradiction between con-
gested available spectrum bands for new applications and
underutilized allocated spectrum reveals the shortcomings of
the current static spectrum allocation policy. Thus, dynamic
spectrum access has been considered as a promising way to
improve the utilization of scarce spectrum [1]-[5].
To make full use of the spectrum resources and realize dy-
namic spectrum sharing between primary and secondary users,
many state-of-the-art methods have been studied and deployed
in existing literatures [6]-[8]. One of the key challenges in
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dynamic spectrum access networks is to re-use spectrum holes
such that primary networks are protected from interference
while the quality of service (QoS) of the secondary users
is guaranteed. The strategies of spectrum access and power
allocation are widely explored to mitigate the interference on
primary networks and smooth spectrum handover [9]-[13]. In
underlay mode, the operation of secondary user is permitted
as long as the interference caused by the secondary user does
not affect the primary user’s QoS, when they coexist in the
networks. In overlay mode, secondary users opportunistically
occupy the primary user’s idle spectrum until they detect the
primary activity again.
So far, market-based mechanisms have been investigated
as a promising approach of dynamically assigning available
spectrum to interested buyers. In particular, auction-based
spectrum access has been considered as an efficient means
of dynamically assigning available spectrum to potential sec-
ondary users [14]-[18]. Notably, the authors in [14] raise a gen-
eral framework for truthful double spectrum auctions, which
applies a novel winner determination and pricing mechanism
to achieve truthfulness and other economic properties while
significantly improving spectrum utilization. The authors in
[15] design a secondary spectrum trading market when there
are multiple sellers and buyers and propose a general frame-
work for the trading market based on an auction mechanism.
In [16], the authors analyze both sequential and concurrent
auction mechanism for allocating the coordinated access band
spectrum, which is divided into a fixed number of chunks.
The allocation must satisfy a constraint that each bidder is
allocated at most one chunk of the spectrum. Reference [17]
considers a short-term secondary spectrum trading between
one seller and multiple buyers in a hybrid spectrum market
with both guaranteed contracts and spot transactions. In ad-
dition, [18] presents a secondary spectrum market where a
primary license holder can sell access to its unused or under-
used spectrum resources in the form of certain fine-grained
spectrum-space-time unit. Specifically, the authors investigate
auction mechanisms to allocate and price spectrum resources
to maximize license holder’s revenue.
Consider the spectrum dynamics and lack of centralized
authority and smooth interaction, spectrum access strategy
always needs to adapt to the node mobility, channel varia-
tions and dynamic wireless traffic based on locally observed
information in a distributed manner. It is proved that, com-
pared to the auction-based spectrum access, the pricing-based
spectrum access incurs lower overhead and interaction [19]-
[23]. In [19], the transmission rate of each secondary user is
assumed to be a function of network congestion (like for TCP
traffic) and the price per bandwidth unit. Primary operators
sell spare bandwidth to secondary users, and set spectrum
access prices to maximize their revenue. The authors in [20]
propose a joint power/channel allocation scheme that improves
the performance through a distributed pricing approach. In
the scheme, a price-based iterative water-filling algorithm is
designed, which enables secondary users to reach a good
Nash equilibrium. Reference [21] presents a techno-economic
analysis for regulated secondary access based on a base
station-centric framework, where secondary users coexist with
the subscribers, i.e., primary users, on a mutually exclusive
basis. The framework is aimed at maximizing the localized
spectrum utilization within the static spectrum licensed to the
wireless service providers. Furthermre, reference [22] analyzes
a price competition scenario by identifying a class of conflict
graphs, in which the authors refer to as mean valid graphs,
such that the conflict graphs of a large number of topologies
that commonly arise in practice are mean valid. Besides,
in reference [23], a hierarchical spectrum trading model is
presented to analyze the interaction among WRAN service
providers, TV broadcasters and WRAN users.
To improve the success of dynamic spectrum access, pro-
viding proper economic incentives to all parties involved is
essential. In recent years, market-driven secondary spectrum
trading has been widely investigated as a promising approach
to address the incentive issue. However, there are still some
challenges when spectrum trading is applied in practical
complicated networks. Unlike traditional commodities, the
availability of leasing spectrum is often not deterministic. Due
to the uncertainty of primary user’s activities, the spectrum
owner usually cannot obtain the availability information in
advance and may require to withdraw part of leasing spectrum
stochastically. In this circumstance, how to establish a suitable
and flexible contact to balance secondary user’s interest and
stabilize the market need to be further considered [24], [25].
Furthermore, most of the existing works are based on a basic
assumption: The information interactions between the primary
users and secondary users as well as the secondary users
themselves are transparent and smooth, and the time, cost and
transmit power involved in the course can be ignored [26],
[27]. Thus, a specific and feasible interaction protocol used
in the auction behavior should be investigated and formed.
Besides, during dynamic spectrum allocation, the spectrum
for sale will change with surrounding cell condition. It can be
imaged that the channel suffered from lower interference levels
owns higher marginal cost and is desired to reap more revenue
for the primary system. Furthermore, the secondary user’s
individual demand and budget level are also different which
leads to the diversity of spectrum selection preference. In this
circumstance, the spectrum owner should design a detailed
channel pricing mechanism to adapt to the development of
spectrum quality and customer demand with the intention of
profit maximum.
Market-based spectrum allocation has been constantly in-
vestigated in recent years, because of its incentive nature to
best utilize the limited radio spectrum and match telecom
operators’ own interests. Generally, the study on the spectrum
trading is unfolded in the following approaches: At first, in
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Fig. 1. System model for dynamic spectrum access networks. BS, PU and
SU represent base station, primary user and secondary user, respectively.
order to achieve the demand balance between spectrum owners
and secondary buyers, online auction with unknown or fixed
spectrum supplies is proposed to enable reusability-driven
spectrum allocation [28], [29]. Particularly, the truthful auction
mechanism is the key issue during the course which attracts
lots of attention. Secondly, joint channel and power allocation
scheme is investigate to guarantee primary system’s profit
and suitably control the internet interference caused by the
secondary customers [30], [31]. Third, pricing-based spectrum
trading is designed to maximize the social welfare or spectrum
utility efficiency where the total transmission capacity of the
secondary or primary users attracts main concerns [32]. In
this paper, we mainly investigate the impact of secondary
user’s spectrum preference on the channel pricing and system
profit during the heterogenous spectrum trading. In this case,
different user behavior characteristics in spectrum usage are
discussed to improve the system’s benefit. In our system
model, we assume the unused spectrum of primary system
constitutes a spectrum pool. Then, the idle spectrum with
uniform bandwidth is divided into high-quality channel or
low-quality channel for sale according to different interference
levels suffered which are caused by adjacent cells or other
secondary users. Thus, a specific pricing strategy appropriately
revealing the diversity of spectrum quality and the supply-
demand relationship of spectrum trading needs to be addressed
naturally. On the other hand, a secondary user chooses one
channel for usage in the light of its selection preference which
is obviously affected by the emergence degree of spectrum
demand and its available fund. Based on the distribution
characteristics of secondary selection preference, we achieve
a pricing solution for the primary system by using Hotelling
model.
The following points highlight the main contributions of the
paper:
 We classify the leased channels by spectrum quality
and propose a system model to specifically describe the
diversity of leased channels as well as secondary buyer’s
demands.
 A preference parameter is designed to formulate the
satisfactory degree of the secondary user on the channels
with unlike qualities. Detailed analysis on the effect of
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trading preference for both primary system and secondary
buyer is provided. To our knowledge, there are few re-
search works investigating the impact of secondary user’s
preference on the spectrum pricing in dynamic access
networks when primary system’s spectrum is divided into
various types.
 A suitable objective function decided by the secondary
user’s preference characteristic and desired marginal cost
of the leased channel is proposed to build a Hotelling
model. Besides, detailed undifferentiated preference pat-
tern and spectrum exchange path with regard to supply-
demand relationship and channel qualities are further
provided.
 An iterative pricing algorithm is achieved by fixing the
Nash equilibrium. The system model we proposed in this
work approaches to the real commodity deal in daily life
where the buyers always need to make a subtle balance
between the product quality and price.
 Essential analysis and discussion on the existence of Nash
equilibrium and the convergence conditions of the itera-
tive algorithm are provided. Furthermore, corresponding
analysis on the numerical results is provided to evaluate
the interaction between the channel quality and spectrum
pricing in dynamic access networks.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II describes the system model in dynamic spectrum access
networks. The algorithm based on the Hotelling model for
solving the problem of spectrum pricing is presented in
Section III. Furthermore, the effects of selection preferences
of primary system and secondary dealer on spectrum trading
along with the proof for the Nash equilibrium and convergence
characteristic of our proposal are also provided in Section III.
Section IV presents the numerical results and analyses. Finally,
Section V concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As the radio spectrum allocated to TV services remains
largely unoccupied in many areas, the FCC initiates a change
in the spectrum usage policy to allow unlicensed service to
operate on the sub-900 MHz TV bands in which two kinds of
systems including TV system and wireless microphone system
are usually working [33]. In this paper, we thus consider a
system model where two licensed user systems and numbers
of unlicensed users coexist as shown in Fig. 1. Suppose the
primary systems are working on a broad band and the unused
spectrum can form a shared-use pool in which the overall
available bands are divided into lots of uniform channels
to facilitate subsequent sale. The channel qualities in the
spectrum pool are not symmetrical due to different interference
levels caused by random user locations. The channels in the
spectrum pool are assumed to be orthogonal, and primary
systems will select part of the unused channels to lease as
shown in Fig. 2. We suppose every single secondary user
can only purchase one channel for usage, and every buyer
has its own selection preference. In this case, the spectrum
suppliers are supposed to be fixed and the spectrum buyers
cannot purchase spectrum resource in other ways. For primary
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Fig. 2. A spectrum pool where two kinds of leased channels located
systems, it is essential to study a suitable pricing mechanism
for maximizing own revenue according to the distribution
characteristic of buyer’s preference.
We assume the interference suffered by an immobile sec-
ondary terminal is not uniform when it uses a channel in the
spectrum pool. In same bandwidth, a leased channel with high-
quality spectrum can be expressed as Ch, and with low-quality
spectrum as Cl, where Ch > Cl > 0. Parameter Ci denotes
the channel capacity which can be given as
Ci = B log2(1 +
w
Isi
); (1)
where B is bandwidth, w is the power received by the
secondary user and Isi is the interference suffered at the
channel. In fixed bandwidth B and power w, different Isi
mean diverse spectrum qualities. It can be imaged that the
interference suffered by the secondary purchaser is mainly
invoked by mobile terminals within the cell, adjacent cells
even other secondary users unregistered.
In this case, we can cast the pricing problem into the
model of duopoly competition where two suppliers, similar to
high-quality spectrum and low-quality spectrum, competing
in prices and products tend to attract more potential buyers
which will finally lead to a dynamic balance. This idea
became known among economists as the principle of minimum
differentiation which first proposed by Hotelling [34]. In fact,
a mature market is always controlled by only few huge corpo-
rations which likely comes into being a monopoly economy.
Hotelling generalized Bertrand’s model by considering differ-
ent firms’ locations in geographic space, later this model was
more often interpreted as a model of product differentiation
which is an important feature of actual business. In this
paper, we also assume all the participants are rational with
the intention of pursuing interest maximization. Furthermore,
the primary systems expect to sell all of idle channels rather
than the low-quality channels only, therefore an appropriate
pricing strategy should be designed so as to attain a market
equilibrium. Here, it should be mentioned that it is worthy of
researching the heterogeneous channel pricing in this situation
despite we only divide the idle spectrum into two types of
channels. In common economic field, many enterprises cannot
subdivide their product into many types in order to occupy the
whole markets due to the limitation of enterprise scale and
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capital. In dynamic access networks, lots of primary users or
small stations usually do not require dividing the spectrum
very detailedly with plenty of computational cost, especially
when the interference condition within the cell is not very
complicated.
III. CHANNEL PRICING
A. User Preference
In this work, we consider the spectrum price includes two
parts, one is the basic value representing variant spectrum
qualities, and the other is the interference pricing. The interfer-
ence within the primary systems will increase with the upgrade
of system load. Furthermore, we consider the secondary utility
function can contain three parts, including transmission rates,
channel price and increased interference level. For the sec-
ondary consumer, the only intention of its transaction behavior
is to obtain right amount of spectrum usage with minimum
budget. The reduction part of the secondary user’s utility is
mainly caused by its monetary cost. Besides, we consider the
interference increase invoked by the secondary customer on
the primary seller in details, since it will lead to the increase of
the spectrum pricing eventually. Thus, secondary user’s utility
function can be given as
Us =    Ci   pi   "Ii (2)
where Ci denotes the spectrum quality, pi is channel pricing,
and Ii is the interference level caused by the secondary
purchaser on primary system.  and " are monetary coeffi-
cients, and  is user preference parameter. Here, we introduce
parameter  to describe user’s demand preference. Define
 locates at the region [; ] with probability distribution
function (PDF) g(). It can be envisioned that the user with
more budget fund will prefer to select a high-quality channel.
In general, secondary users should make a rational choice
between channel quality and cost. In this case, the preference
parameter  plays a key role to influence its final decision.
Here, we define a non-preference coefficient b to describe
the balancing state for the secondary buyer. When  = b,
it means the secondary user has no preference for any kind
of channels since equal cost function can be attained at this
moment. Thus, there is the following equation
US = US
0 ) bCl pl "Il = bCh ph "Ih (3)
Then, we have
b =
ph   pl + "(Ih   Il)
(Ch   Cl) (4)
where Ii denotes the interference caused by the spectrum
buyer on the primary receiver which can be expressed as
Ii = gijwj . Parameter gij which is positive represents the
path gain (not including fading) from the jth transmitter to
the ith receiver. It can be expressed as gij = hijcij , where
hij = A=r

ij and cij is the correlation coefficient. rij denotes
the distance between terminal i and terminal j. A is a constant
gain, and suppose  = 2. In the analysis below, we assume gij
is constant, and does not change much with time. Rewriting
(4), we can obtain
b =
ph   pl + "Awj (chj=r2hj   clj=r2lj)
(Ch   Cl) (5)
wj is the transmit power of the secondary user. When
secondary user’s preference parameter satisfies  > b, it
prefers to choose a high-quality channel. On the other hand,
when  < b, it is likely to purchase a low-quality channel for
usage.
Secondary buyer’s preference diversity on different kinds of
channels will affect its own selection as well as the channel’s
price. Besides, for a primary system, its channel pricing
can be decided directly by the scarcity degree of current
idle channels and potential market evaluation on its channel
quality. We thus define parameter 1 to denote the primary
system’s preference on the leased channels which implies an
anticipated price. Similarly, for the secondary users, they need
to make a judgement whether or not to accept the channel
price according to their capital budget and spectrum demand.
We use parameter 2 to express the secondary preference of
owing capital so as to make full use of the limited money to
exchange the access authority. Then, we analyze the impact of
the secondary preference on spectrum trading for both primary
systems and secondary users.
Prior to the channel trading, we suppose the initial number
of primary idle channels to be i0 and the secondary user’s
budget as r0 as shown in Fig. 3. We further consider the
idle channel number and acquired revenue of the primary
system change to be i and r after the deal. Therefore, the
channel and capital quantity occupied by the secondary user
are i0   i and r   r0 after the spectrum trading, respectively.
Thus, in a rectangular coordinate system as shown in Fig.
3, any coordinate (r; i) can represent a pattern of spectrum
trading in the rectangle 0  r  r0; 0  i  i0. In Fig. 3,
the undifferentiated preference curves of the primary system
are presented. The curves show a downward trend with the
progress of the spectrum trading, since the primary system
needs to deliver part of idle channels if it wishes to receive
profit. Meanwhile, the secondary user obtains the spectrum
authority by paying the fee within its budget.
We utilize undifferentiated curves to depict the preference
degree of the primary system on unused idle channels and
reaping profit. If the primary system can receive similar
satisfaction with either occupying i2 idle channels and r2
revenue at v2 in Fig. 3, or preserving i1 idle channels and
r1 revenue at v1, we consider there is no difference for
the primary system at point v1 and point v2. Another word,
compared with 1, it is also acceptable for the primary system
to decrease channel number in content of (i1 i2) in exchange
for receiving system profit in (r2   r1). Therefore, as shown
in Fig. 3, all the points with same satisfaction degree in 1
and 2 can form an undifferentiated curve MN , and the
points with higher satisfaction degree for the primary system
exist in another curve M1N1. It can be envisioned many
undifferentiated curves for the primary system can coexist in
the figure, and we express the curve family as
f(r; i) = 1 (6)
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where 1 is the satisfaction degree. When 1 increases,
the curves move upper-right. Furthermore, as idle channel’s
quality upgrades, the curves will decrease slowly than before
as shown in Fig. 4 since the primary system wishes to achieve
more profit when better channels have been provided for sale.
Otherwise, the curves will get down fast in condition of worse
channel quality.
Proposition 1. The primary system’s undifferentiated curves
are monotone decreasing, concave and disjoint.
Proof : Firstly, we analyze the monotone decreasing charac-
teristic of the undifferentiated curves. In this coordinate system
shown in Fig. 3, abscissa denotes the revenue received and
ordinate denotes the idle channel number. For the primary
system, the channel resource is its bargaining counter in this
deal. If the primary systme wants to attain the goal of revenue
increase, it needs to decrease the number of idle channels as
an essential cost with the progress of the trading. Hence, the
curves should be monotone decreasing.
Then, we analyze the convexity and concavity of the un-
differentiated curves. For a common trader, the quantity of
goods has apparent affection on the pricing. Large numbers
of commodities likely lead to a lower price. On the contrary,
price rising may be triggered by lack of commodity. Due to
the scarcity of future usable spectrum and blooming band
demand of various wireless application, the channel pricing
tends to upgrade with the decrease of usable channel number.
In general, the bargainer participating in the spectrum trading
would rather pay more 4y in exchange for comparatively
less 4x in condition that it occupies few x which is shown
as the red triangle in Fig. 5. Similar conclusion is that the
primary system tends to raise the price when it had leased
most of idle channels and reaped sufficient profit shown as
the blue triangle in Fig. 5. An essential condition for the deal
realization is the mutual satisfactory for both participants, and
it is understandable that the primary system adjusts pricing
strategy according to its available commodity quantity.
On the other hand, it can be envisioned that primary
system’s undifferentiated curves could be affected apparently
by the spectrum supply-demand relationship during the trading
course. Primary system may choose a steady pricing strategy
to stabilize market expectation and promote product sales.
In this case, primary system’s preference curve should be
a straight line as shown in Fig. 6. In addition, when the
supply-demand relationship of the spectrum market changes
and the supply exceeds demand, which means there are large
numbers of leasing channels and less secondary demands, the
primary system’s preference curve is more likely to become
upper-concave. In current cognitive radio networks, the lack of
spectrum resource and rapid increase of secondary users will
lead to the preference performances shown in Fig. 5 where
spectrum price should unavoidablly increases when leased
channel becomes less.
Last, we prove no joint point can exist in the undifferentiated
curves by proof of contradiction. If there is a joint point m
in the coordinate system which means two undifferentiated
curves pass through the point, then we have distinct satisfac-
tion degrees at pointm for the primary system. The conclusion
is not suitable for one primary system since same utility cost
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Fig. 3. Undifferentiated preference curves of primary system. i denotes idle
channel number and r denotes the revenue received.
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Fig. 4. Undifferentiated curves of primary system with different channel
qualities.
can be only reached at one point in this coordinate system.
Therefore, the undifferentiated preference curves for a same
system is disjoint. 
Similarly, the secondary users have another undifferentiated
curve family in the spectrum trading which can be expressed
as following
'(r; i) = 2 (7)
No matter what the equations of f; ' are, every participant
owns preference curves in the light of its demand on the spec-
trum. Furthermore, in order to obtain satisfactory exchange
pattern for both parts, we mix their undifferentiated curves
together as shown in Fig. 7, where the coordinate system
and curves marked in red line denote the performance of the
secondary customers and the black line represents the primary
system. In the figure, the primary system’s undifferentiated
curves f(r; i) = 1 and the secondary user’s curves family
'(r; i) = 2 can be depicted with different coordinates
origins. We connect the cross points of two curve families
and mark them by dotted line AB as shown in Fig. 7.
Proposition 2. The trading points satisfying both partic-
ipants should locate at the curve AB, which can be called
exchange path.
Proof : If the spectrum trading happens at another point
0 outside the exchange path AB as shown in Fig. 7, we
can suppose the interaction point is  generated by the cross
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Fig. 6. Undifferentiated curves of primary system with different pricing
strategies.
of the undifferentiated curve through 0 and AB. Then, the
primary system obtains same satisfaction degree in  and 0
while the satisfaction degree of secondary user on  is higher
than that of 0. The satisfaction degrees for both parts are
obviously different, and the secondary user would rather stay
at point  than 0 in order to save the money. Consequently,
the participant involved in the trading cannot reach a balancing
satisfaction degree at the point 0 to finish the deal.
B. Pricing Game
Having analyzed the relationship between user’s preference
and channel price, then we discuss the pricing game for
both the high-quality channel and low-quality channel of the
primary system in this subsection by using Hotelling game
model. For the seller, the quantity and price of the commodity
are the most important issues which are both affected by
market demand. In this case, the demand functions for high-
quality and low-quality channels can be given as
Dh(ph; pl) = N
Z 
b
g()d = N [1 G(b)]
= Nf1 G[ph   pl + "(Ih   Il)
(Ch   Cl) ]g
(8)
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Fig. 7. Exchange path.
Dl(ph; pl) = N
Z b

g()d = NG(b)
= NG[
ph   pl + "(Ih   Il)
(Ch   Cl) ]
(9)
where N is the number of secondary users, and g() is the
probability distribution function. It is clear that 0 < Dh < N ,
0 < Dl < N . Suppose the cost functions of the licensed
systems are Sh = shDh(ph; pl) and Sl = slDl(ph; pl),
whereas the cost of high-quality channel is large than the cost
of low-quality channel denoted as 0 < sl < sh. According to
(8) and (9), we can obtain the pricing functions as
ph = fh(qh; ql) = ClF (1  qh
N
  ql
N
) + (Ch  Cl)F (1  qh
N
)
(10)
pl = fl(qh; ql) = ClF (1  qh
N
  ql
N
) (11)
where F () is the inverse function of G(), and qh;l are the
corresponding channel number. Due to F 0 = 1G0() > 0, we
have F (1   qhN   qlN ) < F (1   qhN ). Furthermore, since 0 <
F (1  qhN   qlN ) < 1, there are 0 < ph < Ch, 0 < pl < Cl.
The product quantity competition of the licensed system
can be formulated by Cournot bargaining model [35], [36],
and the profit functions of the high-quality channel and low-
quality channel in this case can be expressed as
CH(qh; ql) = qh[ClF (1 
qh
N
  ql
N
)+(Ch Cl)F (1  qh
N
) Ch]
(12)
CL (qh; ql) = ql[ClF (1 
qh
N
  ql
N
)  Cl] (13)
In this paper, we mainly want to investigate the spectrum al-
location strategy in perspective of pricing bargaining instead of
quantity competition. For primary systems, they can lease part
of temporarily unused spectrum for reaping monetary incomes
or preserve the channels for future potential applications. Here,
we assume the marginal cost for every single channel to be
Mi = Ci, where  is a cost coefficient. Due to sacrificing
the reuse right of the leased spectrum for future appplications,
primary systems need to take the cost into account. Thus, the
profit functions for high-quality and low-quality channels can
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be given as
h(ph; pl) = (ph  Mh)Dh
= N(ph   Ch)f1 G[ph   pl + "(Ih   Il)
(Ch   Cl) ]g
(14)
l(ph; pl) = (pl  Ml)Dl
= N(pl   Cl)G[ph   pl + "(Ih   Il)
(Ch   Cl) ]
(15)
For given preference region [; ], different PDFs of the
preference parameter will have an apparent impact on the final
pricing scheme of the primary systems. When the secondary
users have abundant budget to purchase the channels or put
more emphases on the spectrum quality than spectrum price,
it can be predicted that they will prefer to select a high-
quality channel with a relatively expensive cost. In this case,
we assume the PDF of parameter  complies with the linear
distribution in region [; ], therefore the utility functions for
the leased channels can be expressed as
h(ph; pl) = N(ph   Ch)
Z 
b
g()d
= N(ph   Ch)
Z 
b
d
=
1
2
N(ph   Ch)(2   2b )
=
1
2
N(ph   Ch)
f2   (ph   pl)
2 + "(Ih   Il)["(Ih   Il) + 2(ph   pl)]
2(Ch   Cl)2 g
(16)
l(ph; pl) = N(pl   Cl)
Z b

g()d
= N(pl   Cl)
Z b

d
=
1
2
N(pl   Cl)(2b   2)
=
1
2
N(pl   Cl)
f (ph   pl)
2 + "(Ih   Il)["(Ih   Il) + 2(ph   pl)]
2(Ch   Cl)2   
2g
(17)
In addition, when preference parameter  is an uniform
distributed variable located in region [; ], the profit functions
can be obtained as
h(ph; pl) = N(ph  Mh)
Z 
b
g()d
=
N(ph   Ch)
    [  
ph   pl + "(Ih   Il)
(Ch   Cl) ]
(18)
l(ph; pl) = N(pl  Ml)
Z b

g()d
=
N(pl   Cl)
    [
ph   pl + "(Ih   Il)
(Ch   Cl)   ]
(19)
In this paper, we mainly focus on the situation where the
secondary selection preference complies with the linear distri-
bution in [; ], and similar conclusions can also be achieved
in case of uniformed distribution of . When secondary users
prefer high-quality channel even though they have to afford
expensive cost, primary system needs to design a suitable
price mechanism attracting the consumers to obtain higher
profits. We thus consider the primary systems are rational
whose main objective is to pursue profit maximization. Based
on the necessary conditions for Nash equilibrium, the optimal
channel pricing at step k + 1 can be derived from (16) and
(17) as following
pk+1h = p
k
h +
@h(ph; pl)
@ph
= pkh +
N
2
f2   (p
k
h   pkl )(pkh   pkl + 2"(Ih   Il))
2(Ch   Cl)2 +
"2(Ih   Il)2 + 2(pkh   Ch)(pkh   pkl + "(Ih   Il))
2(Ch   Cl)2 g
(20)
pk+1l = p
k
l +
@l(ph; pl)
@pl
= pkl +
N
2
f (p
k
h   pkl )(pkh   pkl + 2"(Ih   Il))
2(Ch   Cl)2 +
"2(Ih   Il)2 + 2(pkl   Cl)(pkl   pkh   "(Ih   Il))
2(Ch   Cl)2   
2g
(21)
Hence, after setting initial pricing p0h; p
0
l , we can obtain the
optimal pricing strategy by numbers of iterative operations.
We will give essential proofs for the existence of the Nash
equilibrium and the iterative convergence characteristic later.
Then, by ascertaining the equilibrium point of the spectrum
pricing, we can obtain the optimal system profits as following
@h(ph; pl)
@ph
= 0 = 
2 
(pkh   pkl )(pkh   pkl + 2"0) + "02 + 2(pkh   2Ch)(pkh   pkl + "0)
0
(22)
@l(ph; pl)
@pl
= 0 =
(pkh   pkl )(pkh   pkl + 2"0) + "02 + 2(pkl   2Cl)(pkl   pkh   "0)
0
  2
(23)
where "0 = "(Ih  Il) and 0 = 2(Ch Cl)2. Rewriting (22)
and (23), we have
(pkh pkl )(pkh pkl +2"0)+"02+2(pkh 2Ch)(pkh pkl +"0) = 0
2
(24)
(pkh pkl )(pkh pkl +2"0)+"02+2(pkl  2Cl)(pkl  pkh "0) = 02
(25)
Combining (24) and (25), we can obtain
(pkh   pkl )(pkh   pkl + 2"0) + "02 + (pkh   pkl + "0)
(pkh   pkl   2Ch + 2Cl) =
0(
2
+ 2)
2
(26)
7
(pkh  pkl + "0)(pkh+ pkl   2Ch  2Cl) =
0(
2   2)
2
(27)
Substituting pkh   pkl and pkh + pkl by X and Y , we can get
pkh = (X + Y )=2 and p
k
l = (X   Y )=2. Rewriting (26) and
(27), we have(
(X + "0)(Y   2Ch   2Cl) = 
0(2+2)
2
X(X + 2"0) + "02 + (X + "0)(X   2Ch + 2Cl) = 
0(2 2)
2
(28)
Solving (28) and discarding imaginary solutions, we can get(
X = [(3"
0+0) 8"00+80]1=2 3"0 0
4
Y = 
00
X+"0 + 2Ch + 2Cl
(29)
where 0 = 2Cl   2Ch, 0 = 0(2   2)=2 and 00 =
0(
2
+ 2)=2. Then, we can ascertain pkh, p
k
l by p
k
h = (X +
Y )=2 and pkl = (X   Y )=2. Substituting ph, pl in (16) and
(17), we can achieve the optimal system profits. Supplemental
comments for the pricing mechanism are given as Remarks
below.
Remark 1. For a primary system, the definition of the
marginal cost for every single channel which is denoted as
Mi = Ci contains an assumption Ch > Cl )Mh > Ml.
Due to Ch > Cl, the assumption implies the high-quality
channels consume more potential costs for the primary system.
In another word, it is considered that the primary system would
rather choose the idle channels with high quality for selling
to reap high revenues than reserving these ideal channels for
future applications. Accordingly, the primary system is willing
to afford the potential marginal cost in order to increase current
capital incomes.
From another perspective, in the condition that the marginal
cost difference of high-quality and low-quality channels can
be ignored, we assume the marginal cost denoted by Mh =
Ml = (Ch +Cl)=2. Then, when the preference parameter is
a linear distributed variable in region [; ], the system profit
functions can be expressed as
h(ph; pl) = N [ph   (Ch + Cl)
2
]
Z 
b
g()d
= N [ph   (Ch + Cl)
2
]
Z 
b
d
=
1
2
N [ph   (Ch + Cl)
2
]
f2   (ph   pl)
2 + "(Ih   Il)["(Ih   Il) + 2(ph   pl)]
2(Ch   Cl)2 g
(30)
l(ph; pl) = N [pl   (Ch + Cl)
2
]
Z b

g()d
= N [pl   (Ch + Cl)
2
]
Z b

d
=
1
2
N [pl   (Ch + Cl)
2
]
f (ph   pl)
2 + "(Ih   Il)["(Ih   Il) + 2(ph   pl)]
2(Ch   Cl)2   
2g
(31)
Taking the derivation, the optimal channel pricing at step k+1
can also be obtained.
Remark 2. For a primary system, like an usual producer, it
is essential to guarantee the cost difference between two kinds
of channels can be covered by the price difference which can
be expressed as
Mh  Ml = (Ch   Cl)  P h   P l (32)
If the customers cannot afford the price difference, an alterna-
tive choice for the primary system is to keep the high-quality
channels idle for future possible applications.
Remark 3. When secondary user’s preference complies to
normal distribution, we cannot obtain an closed-form equation
due to lacking complete integrability. When the preference
parameter’s distribution function is complicated, we should
judge whether or not the function is integrable.
Theorem 1. For given function i, if there exists   0
making sup
i2N
Ejij < 1, then i; i 2 N is consistent inte-
grable.
Proof : If we have sup
i2N
Ejij < 1, let " =
sup
i2N
Ejij=" < 1. Then, in condition of  > ", there
is
P (jij  )  Ejij=  sup
i2N
Ejij= < " (33)
where i is the selection preference of secondary user i. As a
result, EjijIfjijg < " works for any t 2 N , which means
sup
i2T
EjijIfjijg  ";   0 (34)
where for every ! 2 

IA(!) =

1; ! 2 A
0; ! 2 AC := 
 nA (35)
Furthermore, for any A 2 < and  > 0, we have
sup
i2N
EjijIA
= sup
i2N
(EjijIATfjij<g + EjijIATfjijg)
 P (A) + sup
i2N
EjijIfjijg
(36)
If fi; i 2 Ng is consistent integrable, we can fix A = 
 and
make 0 large enough so that sup
i2N
EjijIfjij0g < 1, then
there is sup
i2N
Ejij  0+1 <1. In addition, for any " > 0,
allow " large enough to make sup
i2N
EjijIfjij"g < "=2.
Let " = "=(2"), for any A 2 <, only if P (A) < ", we can
obtain
sup
i2N
EjijIA  "P (A) + "=2 < " (37)
Then, the sufficient conditions for consistent integrability can
be met.
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C. Nash Equilibrium and Iterative Convergence
In this section, essential proofs for the existence of the
Nash equilibrium and the convergence of the proposed iterative
algorithm are supplied.
Theorem 2. Having obtained utility function ui = i and
strategy function si = pi as given above, there is a pure Nash
equilibrium for the spectrum pricing game.
Proof : According to Debreu’s equilibrium existence the-
orem [37], for the strategy function si and utility function
ui, there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if the following
sufficient conditions can be met: (1) si is a nonempty and
compact subset in limited Euclidean space. (2) For strategy
combination S, ui is continuous and concave.
First, for strategy combination S, define S :  !  is
the Cartesian direct product of si and i is a simplex with
dimension jsij. si is a compact subset in limited Euclidean
space if and only if si are uniformly bounded and equicontin-
uous functions. If we want to prove si are uniformly bounded,
then 8"1, it needs to certify that 9 = ("1) makes 8' 2 F ,
thus
j'(x1)  '(x2)j < "1 (when (x1; x2) < ) (38)
where (x; y) , max
atb
jx(t)   y(t)j and '(xi) ) si. Since
"1=3 subset of F is a finite set N("1=3) = f'1; '2;    ; 'ng,
according to continuity, 9 = ("=3), then in condition of
(x1; x2), there is
j'i(x1)  'i(x2)j < "1=3 (i = 1; 2;    ; n) (39)
Due to 8' 2 F , 'i 2 N("=3) making d(';'i) < "=3, there
is
j'(x)  '(x0)j
 j'(x)  'i(x)j+ j'i(x)  'i(x0)j+ j'i(x)  '(x0)j
 2d(';'i) + j'i(x)  'i(x0)j < "1 (when (x; x0) < )
(40)
where d(u; v) = max ju(x) v(x)j. Furthermore, it is obvious
that si is continuous and differentiable, therefore we can
conclude that si is a nonempty and compact subset in limited
Euclidean space.
Second, according to the definition of concave function
f(tx + (1 + t)y)  tf(x) + (1   t)f(y), ui is concave if

00
i  0. For the high-quality channels, we needs

00
h =
N(2ph   Ch)
22(Ch   Cl)2 < 0 (41)
Then, we can have
ph < Ch=2 (42)
Appropriate parameter setting will meet this condition. Thus,
we prove a pure Nash equilibrium can exist in this case which
is also unique [38].
Theorem 3. The iterative pricing algorithm we proposed
denoted as (20) and (21) can be convergent in precondition of
appropriate parameter settings.
Proof : Rewriting the iterative pricing algorithm denoted as
(20) and (21) in matrix form, we have
P k+1 = U 1WP k + U 1b; k = 0; 1; 2;    (43)
where
U 1W =
1+N(2ph Ch)0
N
0 (2 2pl+2"0)
N
0 (2ph 4pl+2"0 2Cl) 1+N0 (6pl 4ph 2Cl)

(44)
and
U 1b =
 
N
2 (
2   "02 2"0Ch0 )
N
2 (
"02+2"0Cl
0   2)
!
(45)
where 0 = 2(Ch   Cl)2; "0 = "(Ih   Il).
According to Reference [39], if there is (U 1W ) < 1,
then the iterative algorithm will be convergent. Based on
the Jacobi iteration denoted in (43), the Jacobi matrix can
be expressed as (46). Then, the maximal eigenvalue of the
iterative matrix can be obtained as (47). Hence, the pricing
iterative algorithm for the primary systems finally obtained can
be convergent in condition of appropriate parameter settings
by making (U 1W ) < 1.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to show the
effectiveness of the proposed pricing algorithm. Moreover, the
iterative convergence and Nash equilibrium of the solution
are also evaluated. In this case, we consider the spectrum
trading is performed in cognitive radio networks in which
the licensed users dominate the spectrum and the interference
from adjacent cells can be ignored. Secondary users without
participating the spectrum trading are not allowed to access
the licensed spectrum. For the iterative pricing algorithm,
the initial spectrum pricing for both low-quality and high-
quality channels is p(0)h;l = 0:01. We set monetary coefficients
 = 10; " = 0:5 and cost coefficient  = 0:2, 0:1  Cl 
Ch  3(bps), 1   <   10, 4I = 0:001mW,  = 0:2.
The initial channel prices can be set randomly, and we select
a small initial value in this case. Since the proposed algorithm
is convergent in proper parameter settings, the pricing curve
will converge to same value regardless of the initial point. We
further set common initial monetary coefficients along with
cost coefficients, and the impacts of different  and  on the
channel pricing will provided later in this section. The main
intention of the secondary users participating in the spectrum
trading is to achieve channel authority, thus we make  > " to
put the emphasis of secondary utility on transmission capacity.
Ch and Cl is set in unit bandwidth, and there is Ch > Cl.
Besides, as the interference power is usually much lower than
transmit power of secondary terminal, we fix a small 4I .
Different effects of parameter  on channel pricing are also
provided in subsequent tests.
In Fig. 8, the changes of high-quality channel’ pricing with
different channel quality parameters are given. We can obtain
from Fig. 8 that the price of high-quality channel increases
obviously with growing high-quality channel coefficient Ch in
which another significant quality coefficient Cl is fixed to be
0:3. Except for Ch, the other parameters are constant during
the course which have been given above. As shown in Fig.
8, the pricing algorithms converge in a relative fast speed in
which the proposed algorithm can achieve a steady result after
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U 1W =
0@ @pk+1h@ph @pk+1h@pl
@pk+1l
@ph
@pk+1l
@pl
1A
=

1+N(2ph Ch)0
N
0 (2 2pl+2"0)
N
0 (2ph 4pl+2"0 2Cl) 1+N0 (6pl 4ph 2Cl)
 (46)
(U 1W ) =  = 1  N 
20
+
1
2
r
(2 +
N 
0
)2   4[(1 + Na
0
0
)(1 +
Nd0
0
)  N
22b0c0
0
]
where  = ph + 4"
0   pl   (Ch   Cl); 0 = 2(Ch   Cl)2;
a0 = Ch   3ph   2pl   2"0; b0 = Ch   2ph   pl + "0;
c0 = ph + 2pl   Cl + "0; d0 = 2ph + 3pl   Cl   2"0;
"0 = "(Ih   Il):
(47)
about ten iterations. Furthermore, the high-quality channel’s
variation trend tells that it is predictable for the primary system
that the improvement of channel quality will increase the
channel marginal cost and attract more potential consumers. In
this case, a condition we assumed is the preference demand
of the secondary users complies with the linear distribution
which means the spectrum buyers prefer to select high-quality
channels than low-quality channels. Therefore, the primary
system can perform the spectrum trading in the assumption
that the secondary users would rather pay more money for
higher-quality channels. Then, any increase of channel’s qual-
ity is expected to stimulate the consumption. However, the
primary system also needs to afford more marginal cost when
the spectrum quality is improved, thus it is reasonable for
the primary system to increase the price so as to compensate
higher potential cost.
In Fig. 9, the pricing performance of high-quality channel
is further shown with growing Cl where the other param-
eters keep unchanged as Fig. 8. Descending Cl means a
continuous quality decline for low-quality channel. In this
case, there are more reasons for secondary users with linear
preference parameters to pursue high-quality channels. Thus,
more demands for the high-quality channels will lead to price
increase. However, we can also obtain from Fig. 9 that the
pricing increase of high-quality channel becomes insignificant
even though parameter Cl continues decreasing to a lower
level, which means the acceptable price of the high-quality
channel for the secondary buyer is not unlimited when only
the parameter Cl decreases. We also add an iterative pricing
curve with Ch = 2; Cl = 0:3 and another iterative curve
with Ch = 2:3; Cl = 0:3 to Fig. 9. We can conclude from
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 that the increase of quality gap between
high-quality channel and low-quality channel will bring up the
price of high-quality channels, when the selection preference
of secondary users is linear distributed.
We also show the low-quality channel pricing with different
channel coefficients Ch and Cl in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11,
respectively. In Fig. 10, we set a fixed low-quality channel
coefficient Cl = 0:8 with variable Ch to testify the impacts
on the pricing of low-quality channels. When the quality of
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Fig. 8. High-quality channel’s pricing with different Ch
high-quality channel increases which means a relative quality
descending for the low-quality channel, rational secondary
users will tend to make a choice with higher income. Hence, it
can explain the variation trend of low-quality channel’s pricing
with variable Ch. Besides, in Fig. 11, we set the high-quality
channel coefficient as Ch = 2:5. As shown in Fig. 11, the
pricing of low-quality channel will have a normal increase
with improved channel quality. We also observe that the low-
quality channel’s pricing cannot decrease indefinitely even the
coefficient Cl becomes very low, since a bottom price for the
low-quality channel should be able to cover the marginal cost
of the primary system.
Other parameters also have obvious impacts on the channel
pricing. Fig. 12 shows the results in conditions of variant
monetary coefficients  where solid-line curves represent the
pricing of high-quality channel and dotted line curves repre-
sent the pricing of low-quality channel. We set the algorithm’s
coefficients as  = 10; " = 0:5 and cost coefficient  = 0:2,
Cl = 0:3, Ch = 2,  = 1,  = 10, 4I = 0:001. When
monetary coefficient  increases from 3 to 16, both of the
high-quality and low-quality channels’ pricing increases. A
rise of the monetary coefficient  means the increase of the
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Fig. 10. Low-quality channel’s pricing with different Ch
idle spectrum’s evaluation value. For the secondary users, a
larger monetary coefficient can increase its utility function as
shown in (2), thus the secondary users can afford higher price
with better profit expectation.
In Fig. 13, the effects of the high-quality channel’s pricing
with different convergent speeds are presented. Here, we set
the algorithm parameters as  = 10; " = 0:5 and cost
coefficient  = 0:2, Cl = 0:3, Ch = 2,  = 1,  = 10,
4I = 0:001. And the coefficient  is changing from 0:1
to 0:9. The convergence speeds of our proposed iterative
algorithm can be adjusted by tuning  without changing other
parameters.  can be regarded as the regulatory factor for
convergent speed. By adjusting  , we can accelerate the
algorithm convergence without changing the pricing value.
Also, a divergence state of the iterative algorithm is given
in Fig. 14. We just raise  to 1:5, and the other parameters
remain unchanged. The iterative pricing algorithm becomes
divergent when  is too high. As we discussed in Section III,
unsuitable parameter settings cannot guarantee the algorithm’s
convergence. A careful selection on the pricing parameters is
needed to obtain a stable and ideal outcome.
Furthermore, Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 show the changes of the
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system profits with different spectrum pricing. Other param-
eters are settled as  = 10; " = 0:5, Cl = 0:15, Ch = 3:5,
 = 1,  = 10, N = 5 and 4I = 0:001. We adjust  from
0:5 to 1:5. As shown in Fig. 15, the curves which represent
the profits of high-quality channels behave as convex function
with maximum values. The peaks of the curves mean the
maximum system profits. We can obtain from the optimal
value when the primary system’s spectrum pricing reaches
the Nash equilibrium point, which is similar to real market
that over price will discourage customer’s demand and lead
to the decrease of system’s income in the end. Additionally,
Fig. 16 shows that the system profit of low-quality channels
is less than that of high-quality channels in same channel
quantity. Since the secondary user’s spectrum preference is
linear distributed, the system profits become concentrated in
the high-quality channels. We can also obtain from Fig. 15
and Fig. 16 that the channel pricing becomes higher with
increasing cost coefficients , since high cost coefficient means
the primary systems have to afford more marginal cost. Thus,
in this condition, the primary systems need a high channel
price to guarantee their profits.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a pricing-based spectrum access mechanism
has been designed to solve the problem of spectrum allocation
in dynamic access networks where lots of unused spectrums
with different qualities constitute a spectrum pool and need
to be suitably classified and priced. In order to accurately
describe the spectrum quality diversity, we have introduced
the concepts of interference difference caused by adjacent
cells or other unlicensed secondary users and a preference
parameter to represent secondary user’s selection intention.
Secondary user chooses an idle channel for usage according to
its selection preference. We have further gave the analysis and
discussion on the effects of the selection preference of both
primary system and secondary buyer. A Hotelling game model
which is fit for describing the market with product diversity
is adopted to pursue the pricing algorithm. The system model
we proposed in this work approaches to the real commodity
deal in daily life where the customers always need to make a
rational balance between product quality and price. Essential
analysis and proof on the existence of Nash equilibrium and
the convergence characteristics of the iterative algorithm are
also provided. In future research work, the primary spectrum
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Fig. 16. Low-quality pricing with different cost coefficients 
pricing in other conditions where the selection preference of
the secondary user complies to more complicated distribution
needs to be deeply investigated. Besides, we will consider
to further distinguish primary spectrum by more kinds of
qualities and study the corresponding trading preference of the
secondary users along with the appropriate spectrum pricing
strategy.
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